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This small book presents a compact summary of Harry Collins’ current account of expertise and a 
spirited defense of the epistemic authority of science. A polemical pamphlet like this is naturally 
short on detailed argumentation, so a review of it has to focus on the big picture.  
The central question of the book is: do scientists have any kind of special epistemic authority or 
expertise? Using his own concepts, Collins asks: is there anything else than default expertise? By 
default expertise Collins refers to the idea that we are all experts and nobody has any special 
expertise. If default expertise is all there is, then celebrities and basically anyone able to use the 
Internet has the same claim to expertise as scientists with special education and research experience 
on the topic. Collins does not think this is the case, and he suggests that his theory can explain what 
is the difference between scientific expertise and everyday ability to form opinions about any issue.  
Collins begins his argument by presenting a highly streamlined history of science studies in the 
last century. The basic narrative of chapter 1 is familiar from his other publications. History, 
philosophy, and sociology of science started as a Wave 1 that accepted the special epistemic status 
of science, assumed that ultimately scientific knowledge is valid because it corresponds to reality, 
and thus did not analyze scientific research as ordinary cognitive and social activity. Then came 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and initiated Wave 2. The sociology of 
scientific knowledge (SSK) was born. Armed with the principle of symmetry, it opened the black 
box of epistemic activities in science and demonstrated that they are analyzable in social terms. 
However, something went wrong. The early SSK studies were hard and painstaking as the 
sociologists thought it was necessary to understand the science they were studying, but somehow 
the field was taken over by people whose background was in fields like literary criticism and 
semiotics and who did not pay attention to the contents of the sciences they studied.  
One of the key failures was the acceptance of what Collins calls the relational theory of 
expertise. According to this view, to be an expert is to be called an expert. This labeling view of 
expertise led to problems when sociologists analyzed sheep farmers and AIDS activists. As these 
people seemed to have some relevant expertise and as their expertise was not recognized by the 
scientific community, they were called lay experts. For Collins this was a fundamental mistake. If 
we assume that both lay people and scientists are experts, then everybody is an expert and thus we 
are led to a position that assumes that there is only default expertise. According to Collins, to avoid 
this conclusion we have to have a substantial theory of expertise. Thus, he argues that the farmers 
were not lay people but members of an elite group of experienced farmers. The scientific 
community does not have monopoly on expertise, but this does not imply that everybody is an 
expert on everything. So in these controversies “… there were still no ’lay experts’ involved: 
members of the general public were nowhere to be seen, except in the distorted interpretations of 
research.” (p. 41) 
  
In chapter 2 Collins presents a summary of his taxonomy of expertise that focuses on substantive 
expertise and not merely on the social status of being expert. The first element in the taxonomy is 
ubiquitous expertise. Ubiquitous expertises are acquired through growing up in a society, and 
basically everyone has them. Ability to speak one’s native language, follow societal mores and 
norms are examples of this sort of expertise. Everybody has ubiquitous expertise, but it might be 
very difficult to teach this kind of expertise to a computer. Because this sort of expertise is so 
widely distributed, it is not usually regarded as expertise. So although ubiquitous expertises are the 
basis for acquiring any other kind of expertise, they are often invisible.  
The route to acquire specialist expertise is to work with other experts and slowly accumulate 
relevant tacit knowledge. Collins distinguishes two components in specialist expertise. The first is 
contributory expertise, which is based on the ability to contribute to a field of expertise. The other 
component is interactional expertise, that is, fluency to talk about the area of expertise. Both of 
these are lacking in non-experts, who have not been embedded in relevant specialist communities. 
So no matter how much they have been reading beer mats, popular science, or even specialist 
publications, they do not have specialist expertise. In other words, reading is not enough for 
expertise, as one needs a long period of apprentice.  
Finally, Collins defines meta-expertise as an ability to judge other experts. Non-transmuted 
meta-expertise can be based on expertise on related technical domain (referred expertise), one’s 
own competence in the same domain (downward expertise), or technical connoisseurship, which is 
based on long-term familiarity with the domain. In addition to the specialist meta-expertise, there is 
also ubiquitous meta-expertise that is based on local or more general discriminative ability to form 
opinions about expert’s competence. Again, this kind of meta-expertise is not a very good basis for 
evaluating the competence of real experts.  
This scheme is put in action in chapters 3 and 4. In chapter 3, Collins argues that evaluation of 
scientific claims is impossible without being a member of the core-set of specialists who do the 
experiments, build the theories, and meet each other in conferences. All others are bound to lose 
nuances and doubts, and thus are victims of the ”direct square law” of knowledge: distance lends 
enchantment. Thus outside readers of the Climategate emails will misunderstand their meaning, 
non-specialists do not understand why members of gravitation-wave community are fully justified 
in ignoring Joe Weber’s 1996 paper in Il Nuevo Cimento, and how president Mbeki was wrong to 
interpret scientific literature without expert help when he doubted the safety of anti-retroviral drugs. 
What is common to all these cases is that non-specialists lack the appropriate interactional and 
meta-expertise that is necessary to avoid taking incompetent or dishonest views as legitimate 
scientific positions. Chapter 4 continues the same line of argument by focusing on vaccine 
protestors. Collins argues that the debate about MMR (Measles, Mumps, and Rubella) vaccine and 
autism is a case of a counterfeit scientific controversy, which reflects newspapers’ failure to do their 
work properly. While ordinary citizens may be in principle able to recognize distortions of the 
scientific process, their limited meta-expertise fails when the media’s misplaced “balanced” 
reporting sends them on the wrong track.  
In the final chapter Collins summarizes his argument and presents a surprise. When articulating 
what Wave 3 of science studies would look like, he returns to old Mertonian ideas. He argues that 
scientific specialists are a special group of people because of their special kind of internalized ethos. 
If one sets aside fraudsters, muscular capitalists, speculative theoreticians, wild-eyed Darwinians, 
media scientists, lobbying scientists, and just “intellectually inbred”, scientists are basically driven 
  
to find out the truth. Thus, “… integrity is built into the very nature of science and the relatively 
rare cheats have simply made a mistake and sacrificed their scientific birthright.” (p. 127). This is 
basically a very simplified version of the Mertonian position. However, Collins goes further. While 
Merton believed that the norms described by him are justified by their effectiveness in creation of 
reliable knowledge, Collins states that “… the norms are good in themselves – good in a moral 
sense.” (p. 128). I guess it is no longer possible to suspect that Collins is some kind of antiscientific 
relativist.  
I believe that the above provides a fair summary of the arguments presented in the book. What 
do I make of it? First, given the nature of this small book, Collins spends all too much time 
describing developments inside STS. His idea is to use academic debate as an indicator of broader 
changes in society, but it would have been better to describe those changes directly. Now we have a 
highly simplified and polemical account of developments inside one social scientific field, but no 
analysis of the changes that they are supposed to reflect. The other structural problem is that all the 
controversies that Collins analyzes are cases of what he calls counterfeit scientific controversies. 
My point is that it is not much of a challenge to show that Jenny McCarthy is not an expert on 
scientific issues related to vaccination. It would have been much more interesting to see if Collins’ 
scheme could help in analyzing some real science-related controversies. What to think about those 
cases where the identification of the core-set is more difficult than in the gravitational wave case? 
What about those cases where the core-set consists of experts from multiple fields, or where 
political and economics stakes make the debate more complicated? My point is that one does not 
need any sociological theory of expertise to reach a right conclusion about the McCarthy case, but it 
might be very useful in more complicated cases. Based on this book, it is impossible to say whether 
Collins’ theory is helpful in these more demanding cases.  
What about the theory itself? Collins’ ideas about tacit knowledge and the core-set are familiar 
to everybody who has read some of his earlier work. Without doubt they capture many important 
issues related to expertise. However, sometimes Collins seems to stretch these ideas too far in a 
direction that mystifies expertise. For example, Collins is eager to show that it is completely 
legitimate for gravitation-wave scientists to completely ignore Joe Weber’s 1996 paper. Now, it is 
completely understandable that these scientists did not have time to read Weber’s piece, not to 
mention writing a rebuttal, but is this really an example of science at its best? Is Collins right in 
suggesting that outsiders should just trust the specialists’ judgment of the paper, although none of 
them has read it? I think Collins seriously underestimates the role that public argumentation in the 
front of the broader scientific community plays in science. This is also shown in the comments he 
makes about Mike Hulme’s and Jerry Ravetz’s call for openness in climate science. Collins 
suggests that this call is misguided and argues that it is impossible for scientists to show their 
working and for science to be publicly owned. However, Hulme and Ravetz are not suggesting that 
climate science is to be judged by default expertise. Rather, they are calling for openness and 
assessment state of knowledge by a broader scientific community that goes beyond the core-set of 
climate scientists. This does not mean the nullification of the expertise of the core-set, it just means 
implementing the ideals that Merton’s norms describe. It might be that Collins does not really mean 
it, but in these passages he seems to make scientific knowledge more opaque than it needs to be. 
My second problem with the theory is the return of the moral character of scientists as the central 
explanation of the epistemic authority of science. Collins seems to make the moral integrity and 
good intentions of individual scientists the most crucial explanatory factor. It would be wrong to 
  
say that this is returning to Merton’s ideas. Merton was talking about how institutional practices and 
norms make science special in terms of producing reliable knowledge. Collins’ theory is much more 
individualistic, and quite clearly less sociological. He is not really returning to Wave 1 ideas, he is 
returning to ideas that predate Wave 1. And if the central challenge for Wave 3 social studies of 
science is “to treat science as special without telling fairy stories about it” (p. 81), one can ask how 
successful Collins’ analysis of scientific expertise really is. I am not raising this question as 
someone who doubts the relevance of ethos in understanding science, I am just puzzled by how 
simplistic the theory is. Surely there has to be more than morally exemplary individuals.  
As a conclusion, I have to report a disappointment about this pamphlet. The topic is important, 
and based on his earlier work I expected that Harry Collins would have something interesting to say 
about it. However, it turns out that his main task is to show that a sociologist can justify the 
intuitive claim that Jenny McCarthy is not a scientific expert. While there might be some internal 
STS debates where this might be an interesting, or even a radical, idea, for a broader (academic and 
non-academic) public it does not provide much. The book is less than it could be, and for this 
reason it is also of limited value in science education. I would prefer my students reading some 
Collins’ papers rather than this book. 
